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The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue. By SARAH ALLAN. 
SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany: 
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, 1997. Pp. xiv + 
181 + illus. $53.50 (cloth); $17.95 (paper). 
Sarah Allan, in The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue, ex- 
plores the premise that linguistic concepts are rooted in cul- 
turally specific imagery. Allan argues that in the process of 
translation the target language inevitably grafts its own imag- 
ery onto the concepts of the original language. Therefore the 
translation process fails to capture the range of meaning and 
the structural relations between terms in the original language. 
Allan's work elaborates this point via an analysis of the meta- 
phors related to water and plants in early Chinese philosophical 
thought. 
Allen's thesis is that "in the absence of a transcendental con- 
cept, the ancient Chinese turned directly to the natural world" 
to explicate their ideas (p. xii). The frame of the book mimics 
her thesis that water and plants are the formative metaphors of 
early Chinese thought. Allan argues first that water images, 
in various forms, predominantly serve to describe the cosmos. 
Next, she explores how plants serve to illustrate the specifically 
human aspect of the cosmos. Within this framework Allan pro- 
ceeds "from the concrete to the abstract"-first presenting the 
range of meaning of the metaphors, then offering an interpreta- 
tion of their use by individual thinkers, focusing on the Men- 
cius and the Laozi. 
Allan's work on imagery sheds light on obscure passages in 
early Chinese texts. For example, pointing out that the xin (heart/ 
mind) resembles a pool of water (p. 82), Allan illuminates 
Mencius' analogy in 7A.24 between the way of water and the 
way a gentleman's mind does not "penetrate." Similarly, noting 
that qi (energy/matter) is vaporized water, Allan uses terms 
from descriptions of how Yu controlled the great flood to ex- 
plain Xunzi's treatment of qi in "Yue Lun" (p. 92). With regard 
to plant imagery, Allan makes the interesting general point that 
in early China people belonged to a category that included both 
plants and animals (wanwu), rather than a category including 
animals but distinct from plants. 
Because her book is a structural analysis of shared features 
of early Chinese thought, Allan's approach tends to highlight 
similarities. However, she also distinguishes distinctive uses of 
imagery in the work of different thinkers. For example, she notes 
that the Laozi and the Zhuangzi use the "qi=water" metaphor 
differently. She writes: "Rather than concentrating one's mind/ 
heart and clarifying the qi, as in the Laozi, or directing the qi in 
channels, the Zhuangzi advocates free movement" (p. 92). 
Although her arguments are generally sound, some of Al- 
lan's interpretations might benefit from further explanation. She 
seems, for instance, to take any reference to "flowing" (liu fL) 
as a reference to water, as if other things, such as breezes, 
can only count as "flowing" insofar as they resemble water. In 
her comment on the Laozi 61, which reads, "A large state is 
the lower reaches [xia liu]," she supplies "[of a river]," which 
begs the question of whether the reference is to water. In dis- 
cussing the same phrase for "lower reaches" (xia liu) that ap- 
pears in the Analects 19.20, she again interprets the phrase in 
terms of water imagery, and translates the reference to "return- 
ing" (gui) in the passage as "flow" (p. 47). In some cases when 
Allan sees "clear" water metaphors, the reader needs more ex- 
planation to be persuaded. Where the Laozi says, "I do nothing 
and yet the people are transformed of themselves, I am fond of 
stillness and the people correct themselves," she provides only 
the comment, "here the water metaphor is particularly clear" 
(p. 117). 
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On the same lines, sometimes Allan's metaphorical analyses 
lead to claims that seem inaccurate without further elaboration. 
For example, she claims that de "is something peculiar to peo- 
ple, an aspect of their hearts that other living things do not 
have" (p. 101). If she means by this that other living things can- 
not be said to have de, then she needs to account for Analects 
14.33 which says "A good horse is praised for its de." In another 
case, Allan takes the xin (heart/mind) to be a container organ, 
rather than a locus for the performance of a certain function 
(p. 85). Allan interprets the character for xin as a picture of the 
heart/mind as an organ. Based on a bronze inscription that 
speaks of "clarifying the mind/heart and revealing the de," she 
concludes that the xin itself is not only an organ, but a recepta- 
cle for de. But even if the character for xin is in fact a picture 
of an organ, there is little evidence that early Chinese thinkers 
viewed the xin as a receptacle. Containers are not the only 
things that, when clarified, reveal something. Water metaphors 
for the xin emphasize water's ability to reflect, rather than the 
pool containing the water. Moreover, as it stands, Allan's use of 
the heart/mind as "organ-containing-de" metaphor is not a con- 
vincing explanation of the claim in Zhuangzi 5/42-45 that de 
fails to shape a hideous person's body. The reference in the 
Zhuangzi is to de failing to shape the form, not failing to shape 
the heart/mind. 
Allan's contention that water and plant metaphors signify the 
passage of time is one of the more controversial aspects of the 
book. She convincingly notes that in Analects 9.17 the pas- 
sage of water (shi 'T) implies what we mean by the passage of 
time. However, extending that connection between water and 
time to a connection between dao and time in the Zhuangzi 
seems unjustified. Allan contends that in the Zhuangzi, "the 
dao clearly comes to incorporate that amorphous ungraspable 
aspect of life: what we call time" (p. 78). To make her point, 
she suggests that in the Zhuangzi people are "in" the dao, that 
it is shapeless and invisible, and that it is humanity's natural 
habitat, as water is to fish (pp. 77-79). From these descriptions, 
one might just as well conclude that the dao (or daos) in the 
Zhuangzi are spatial rather than temporal metaphors. Aside 
from the reference to dao as humanity's habitat (which implies 
that the dao is something other than water, since we are not 
fish), the argument seems strangely disconnected from the root 
metaphors that ground Allan's more successful claims else- 
where in the text. 
By focusing discussion on the claim that we think in meta- 
phor, Allan re-opens a significant philosophical discussion to 
which sinologists rarely attend. Following A. C. Graham, Allan 
takes the position that languages (or their "conceptual schemes") 
are never completely commensurable: "We can... never en- 
tirely comprehend another conceptual scheme" (p. 18). Such a 
position implies that truth is relative to different languages, in- 
sofar as it allows the possibility that a proposition, true in one 
language, can be false in another. But Allan attempts to avoid 
such relativistic conclusions, by claiming a proposition's truth 
can only be affirmed or denied in its own language. She uses 
Graham's sample sentence, "cao qing ye" and notes that it does 
not entail the truth or falsity of the English equivalent transla- 
tion "grass is green." But such an argument does not thereby 
evade the specter of relativism lurking behind any claim that 
languages are truly incommensurable. The argument that these 
two sentences are true or false only with respect to their own 
language capitalizes on the breadth or vagueness of the Chinese 
terms. "Cao" could be straw, plants, or herbs. "Qing" could be 
dark, cool, or wet. Thus the argument can draw the conclusion 
that "cao qing ye" may be true or false without entailing that 
"grass is green" be likewise. But just as "cao qing ye" is too 
broad to map precisely onto "grass is green," so too "grass is 
green" is itself too broad to be affirmed or denied. (Grass is not 
always green.) To constitute a genuine contribution to the debate 
about linguistic incommensurability, the argument requires a 
more specific proposition-"this grass is green," for instance- 
where the referent is clearly identifiable to the language-users. 
That is, to raise the problem of whether or not languages are in- 
commensurable in any philosophically significant way, one 
needs to find a case where the language users agree upon a 
specific "fact" to which the proposition refers, in light of which 
the language users can affirm or deny the proposition. (Donald 
Davidson's sample sentence, "it's raining," illustrates this.) Allan 
is to be credited for discussing these questions, but comparing 
vague sentences does not refute the argument that the notion of 
incommensurable conceptual schemes leads to the relativity of 
truth claims. 
By investigating the extent to which metaphor-analysis is 
necessary for philosophical understanding, Allan's work opens 
the question of how the early Chinese themselves viewed lan- 
guage's functioning. She notes that Chinese characters do not 
generally represent "objects or ideas," but that in their origin 
many characters "reflect ... ideas" (pp. 32-33). However, since 
her ensuing discussion frequently mentions characters that are 
"pictographs" in her terms, it would be helpful to hear why she 
does not think such characters reflect "objects," and what count 
as "objects" and "ideas," both in her terms and in those of the 
early Chinese. 
While the author's individual analyses are not always con- 
vincing, this book succeeds in clarifying the significance of a vast 
range of water and plant symbolism in early Chinese thought. 
More importantly, it succeeds in demonstrating the need for such 
a method in comparing philosophies. 
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